The part of this story that should make an IT owner sit up is not how the attackers got in. It is what they left behind.
In an investigation published on 30 October 2026, Microsoft Threat Intelligence described two human-operated intrusions that began with Teams messages and calls from people claiming to be the company’s own IT support. Both ended at the same place: certificates issued for privileged accounts by the organization’s own certificate authority.
Microsoft is direct about what that means. An attacker holding an authentication certificate for a privileged account can keep using it after that account’s password is reset and after the first compromised workstation is wiped. The standard playbook (reset the credential, reimage the laptop, close the ticket) does not end the intrusion. It just makes everyone feel better.
What Happened
Both cases started with social engineering, not malware. Attackers messaged and called employees on Teams from external tenants, using organization-themed onmicrosoft.com names and support-flavored display names so the contact looked like it came from inside the building. Microsoft notes that Teams showed its External and Scam suspected labels during these attempts, which tells you something about how much attention warning banners actually get.
The pretext worked. Users were walked through opening Quick Assist, the remote help tool built into Windows, and reading the connection code aloud. That handed the caller live control of the machine.
From there the pattern was consistent across both incidents. The attacker dropped an archive into the Downloads folder, unpacked it into a newly created, update-themed folder under the user’s profile, and ran the contents using a portable Python, Bun or Java runtime. Microsoft points out that file names were useless as evidence: one renamed executable, still carried the genuine Bun runtime’s version metadata. The staged code then queried Windows version details, network configuration and running processes, and reached out to domain infrastructure over LDAPS and SMB.
Then the two cases diverged at the certificate layer.
In the first, the attacker found a certificate template vulnerable to ESC1, a configuration in which the requester gets to supply the identity the certificate will represent. When combined with broad enrollment rights, a low-privileged account can use official channels to request a certificate that grants domain administrator privileges from the CA. The opening wave targeted three users and one workstation, and produced certificates for three highly privileged accounts. Roughly 90 minutes later a second wave hit 16 users and a second workstation, yielding certificates for eight more privileged accounts. Within seconds of getting one certificate, the attacker authenticated to a domain controller and ran DCSync.
Microsoft Defender’s automatic attack disruption restricted the covered identities, disconnected sessions, and blocked more than 1,000 subsequent SMB file-access attempts and additional logons. One privileged account, however, had been excluded from automated response. It stayed usable. The attacker used it to reach a file server and ran a renamed copy of Rclone to copy share data to an external SFTP destination. Microsoft’s own summary of the lesson: <q>partial identity containment can reduce attack activity while still leaving a viable privileged route.</q>
In the second case the weak template was not there, so the attacker used PetitPotam to coerce a domain controller into authenticating to an attacker-controlled system, then relayed that NTLM authentication to the AD CS Web Enrollment endpoint. That is ESC8, and it requires no password at all. The attacker requested a certificate for the domain controller account and used it for Kerberos PKINIT to obtain a ticket-granting ticket. Defender raised ESC8 alerts, the customer isolated the workstation, and Microsoft observed no further progression.
No Teams vulnerability was involved. Microsoft did not attribute the activity to a named group, and did not publish the dates the intrusions occurred.
Why This Matters for Businesses
There is no patch here. Nothing in this chain was a software flaw, which means nothing in your patch cycle will fix it.
Active Directory Certificate Services is running quietly in a very large number of Windows domains, usually stood up years ago for Wi-Fi authentication or VPN certificates, and rarely looked at since. The templates created on day one, tend to outlive the person who created them. ESC1 and ESC8 are not new techniques: as The Hacker News noted in its write-up of the research, researchers named both weaknesses in 2021, and PetitPotam was disclosed the same year.
The business consequence is about duration and cost. An intrusion you believe you closed on Tuesday, because you reset passwords and rebuilt a laptop, can still be live on Friday. Microsoft is explicit that revoking a certificate does not retroactively invalidate Kerberos tickets that were already issued, so ticket review is a separate containment step that someone has to actually perform. Every extra day of undetected access is more data staged, more notification exposure and a longer, more expensive forensic engagement later.
The genuinely encouraging part is that the technology worked. Automated disruption cut off the compromised identities and stopped over a thousand follow-on attempts. In the second case, one well-timed device isolation ended the incident. What failed was the governance around the tooling: a single exclusion on a privileged account, and a certificate template nobody had reviewed.
What Organizations Should Consider
These are questions worth putting in front of your IT team or provider this month. The answers are more informative than any product evaluation.
- Do we run AD CS, and when did anyone last review the certificate templates? Specifically, which authentication-capable templates let the requester supply the subject, and who holds enrollment rights on them?
- Is Web Enrollment published, and does anything still need it? Microsoft recommends removing enrollment endpoints that are not required, and enforcing HTTPS plus Extended Protection for Authentication on the ones that stay. Its guidance on NTLM relay against AD CS is published as KB5005413.
- Is certificate auditing switched on? Request and issuance events are the only durable record of what an attacker asked for.
- Which accounts and devices are excluded from automated containment, who approved each exclusion, and what manual action replaces it during an incident?
- How does a staff member verify that an unexpected support call is really us? A published callback number and a rule that nobody reads out a Quick Assist code on an inbound call removes the pretext entirely.
- Would we notice a portable Python, Bun or Java runtime executing from a user’s profile folder, and can our application controls restrict that?
- Does our incident playbook include certificate revocation and Kerberos ticket review, or does it stop at “reset the password”?
None of these requires new spending. Most require an afternoon and someone with the authority to change a template.
How ISM Can Help
This intrusion sits across two disciplines that most organizations buy separately, which is exactly why it works.
Our 24/7 Help Desk & Support gives employees a real support relationship with verified callback procedures, so an unsolicited Teams call claiming to be IT has an obvious way to be checked and fail. Identity & Access Management is where the certificate side gets handled: reviewing AD CS templates, enrollment rights, web enrollment exposure and the containment exclusions that quietly undo your automated response. Cybersecurity & Risk Management ties the two together into detection and an incident plan that treats certificates and Kerberos tickets as containment items rather than afterthoughts, and Managed IT Services keeps that configuration from drifting back over the next three years.
Talk With Our Team
If you have AD CS running somewhere in your domain and cannot say who last reviewed the templates, that is a short conversation worth having. We will go through what your certificate authority is currently willing to issue, to whom, and what your help desk would do if someone called an employee pretending to be us. Get in touch here: phone number, address and form are all on that page.
Prefer to get your bearings first? The Cyber Maturity Calculator takes a few minutes and gives you a sense of where your identity and response controls actually stand before you talk to anyone.
Sources
- From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths, Microsoft Security Blog, 30 October 2026
- Attackers Pose as IT Support on Microsoft Teams, Abuse AD CS to Steal Company Data, The Hacker News, 2 November 2026
Sources
- From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths, Microsoft Security Blog
- Attackers Pose as IT Support on Microsoft Teams, Abuse AD CS to Steal Company Data, The Hacker News